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Abstract 
With the end of China’s 11th Five-Year Plan approaching, this paper analyzes sub-national 
governments’ implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets. Previous 
research focuses on the way governance practices and decision-making structures shape im-
plementation outcomes, yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders 
actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how leaders 
work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation mechanisms officials use to 
strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incentives to fulfill their energy 
efficiency mandates. The analysis is drawn from fifty-three interviews conducted in June and 
July 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest 
that local government leaders conform to the national directives by ‘bundling’ the energy effi-
ciency policy with policies of more pressing local importance  or by ‘bundling’ with the inter-
ests of groups with significant political influence. Ultimately, officials take national policies 
and then frame them in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.  
Key words: China, local state, policy implementation, energy policy, governance 
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1  Introduction 
  Secure energy resources and their intelligent use are keys to China’s continued, rapid de-
velopment. The country recently overtook the United States as the world’s largest energy con-
sumer according to an International Energy Agency (IEA) estimate
1 and, as China’s citizens 
become wealthier, concerns about obtaining greater consumption capability and energy con-
sumption growth will continue into the coming decades.
2 Taking into account China’s popula-
tion size and the considerable gap between China’s energy consumption per capita and that of 
developed economies, this trend has important implications for China and the world. The pri-
oritization of issues by the international community and China may vary (there is much more 
emphasis on climate change and pollution outside of China, while concerns about economic 
growth and energy security take precedence domestically), but China’s energy policy will 
increasingly find itself on the top of national and international policy agendas. At the local, 
sub-national level, however, socioeconomic and political benefits from decreased local energy 
consumption and decreased emissions is not a foregone conclusion and energy efficiency may 
receive less priority. While sustained economic growth based on continued availability of 
energy resources and environmental pollution problems are important issues, local govern-
ments may be more able and willing to manage short-term, local problems such as enterprise 
cash flow difficulties, attracting foreign and domestic investment and social stability issues. 
These problems are more self-contained and manageable, with clear and direct local benefits, 
than issues with significant collective action components like energy policy implementation. 
This collective action problem is particularly severe in China due to the cellular, ‘honeycomb’ 
governance structure
 3 and the resulting competition between localities and variations in local 
level policy implementation. 
 
  This paper thus examines the practices of local governments implementing energy effi-
ciency policy at the sub-national level. The main hypothesis is that local governments con-
form to the national administrative directives by ‘bundling’ the energy consumption manage-
ment policy with policies of greater or more pressing importance for the local government or 
by ‘bundling’ with the interests of groups with significant political influence. Officials often 
opt to ‘kill two (or more) birds with one stone’ by choosing implementation pathways that 
balance local priorities with national targets and are more likely to faithfully implement en-
ergy conservation policies and projects which also address salient business, economic, safety, 
pollution, and political legitimacy interests and concerns in their local constituency. Local 
governments are less likely to strictly implement energy conservation policies without these 
‘policy-bundling’ benefits and employ foot-dragging measures such as seeking loopholes in 
the implementation guidelines.  
 
                                                 
1 International Energy Agency (IEA), “China Overtakes the United States to Become World’s Largest Energy 
Consumer,” July 20, 2010, available at http://www.iea.org/index_info.asp?id=1479. 
2  For an in depth analysis of China’s human development and energy use trends, see Renmin University of Chi-
na, Program of Energy and Climate Economics. China and a Sustainable Future: Towards a Low Carbon 
Economy and Society. (Beijing: China Translation and Publishing Corporation, 2010). 
Vivienne Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford University 
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  Shanxi province is chosen as the research region as it is well-known for its coal produc-
tion and large proportion of energy-intensive enterprises. In the 11
th Five-Year Plan, Shanxi 
was assigned an energy intensity,
4 reduction goal of 25 percent compared to the 2005 level, 
which is higher than the national target of 20 percent. Figures provided in 2007, 2008 and 
2009 Shanxi Provincial Economic Commission reports show the province as being on track to 
meet or surpass its 11
th Five Year Plan energy intensity targets.
 5 However, the specifics of 
this successful implementation have not been studied, and this research sheds light on local 
officials’ interests and incentives. This, in turn, helps to understand specific measures taken to 
reach local energy savings and emissions reduction (ESER) targets. As the current debate of 
energy savings in China focuses on institutional barriers to reaching national goals,
6 this tends 
to obscure the question of what mechanisms and political compromises are needed to imple-
ment policies. The findings of this paper have wider implications for the region and the nation 
as a whole, especially for many developing regions that may follow in Shanxi’s developmen-
tal and energy management footsteps. 
 
  The analysis is drawn from fifty-three interviews conducted in the provincial capital, five 
municipalities, and eleven counties during June and July of 2010. The majority of interview-
ees were officials from the Economic Commission, the Environmental Protection Bureau, and 
the Development and Reform Commission, as well as industrial enterprise managers involved 
in energy intensity reduction and efficiency programs. Interviews were semi-structured and 
provided an understanding of overall implementation at the provincial, municipal, and county 
levels through the study of local circumstances, and similarities and variation between imple-
mentation in different localities. The analysis also draws from government policy documents 
and reports, ESER statistics, statistical  yearbook data, and internal  enterprise energy con-
sumption statistics. 
 
  The next section introduces concepts and arguments relevant to understanding implemen-
tation of national ESER policies at the local level. The subsequent part provides an overview 
of  national  energy  efficiency  efforts  since  2006  and  describes  the  local  policy  context  in 
Shanxi province. The paper then analyzes local players and interests in the implementation of 
two industrial energy efficiency policies: the Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the 
policy of ‘elimination of backwards production capacity' and small plant closure. The re-
search concludes with highlighting the bundling of interests and policies as a common im-
                                                 
4 Energy intensity is the energy consumption per unit GDP. 
5 Shanxi Economic and Information Commission, Shanxi Economic and Information Commission Document 
[2008] 1, (September 2008); Shanxi Economic and Information Commission, Shanxi Economic and Informa-
tion Commission Document [2009] 1, (July 2009); Shanxi Economic and Information Commission, Shanxi 
Economic and Information Commission Document [2010] 1, (May 2010). 
6 Lynn Price, Xuejun Wang, Jiang Yun, “The Challenge of Reducing Energy-Consumption of the Top-1000 
Largest Industrial Enterprises in China,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 11 (November 2010); Xiaofan Zhao and 
Leonard Ortolano, “Implementing China’s National Energy Conservation Policies at State-Owned Electric 
Power Generation Plants,” Energy Policy, Vol. 38, No. 10 (2010), pp. 6293 - 6306.; Mark Levine, Lynn Price, 
Nan Zhou, David Fridley, Nathaniel Aden, Hongyou Lu, Michael McNeil, Nina Zheng, Qin Yining, Ping 
Yowargana, Assessment of China’s Energy-Saving and Emission-Reduction Accomplishments and Opportuni-
ties During the 11th Five Year Plan,  (Berkeley, CA: Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 
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2  Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation: Actors, Interests, and Incen-
tives 
 
  China's energy efficiency programs at the national level have received a great deal of at-
tention in the public policy literature,
7 yet an analysis of local implementation is essential for 
a full understanding of the national ESER initiative. Most China observers are well aware of 
gaps between the central government’s official national policies and its practical outcomes at 
the local levels. In general, there are four competing approaches to understanding local policy 
implementation. First, several studies have linked policy implementation at the sub-national 
level to China’s ‘fragmented authoritarian’ bureaucratic system,
8 arguing that splintered and 
disjointed institutional responsibilities of the implementation system itself are a major con-
tributor to variation in local implementation. A second view explains the gap between na-
tional policies and local practices through China’s highly decentralized governing structure, 
which allows local officials to be more selective about which national policies to implement 
and which ones not to implement.
 9 Other scholars disagree with both views, arguing that the 
center still wields substantial power; this perspective holds that formal constraints imposed by 
the  central  government  should  be  held  to  account  for  the  environmental  ‘implementation 
gap’.
10 And yet another branch of literature suggests that local officials often deviate from the 
policy made at the central level due to a conflict of interest between national and local ac-
tors.
11 A conflict exists because national policies at times fail to take into account policies’ 
potential negative impacts on businesses, employment, and taxation revenues. National poli-
cies without sufficient local support and legitimacy are only implemented strictly when there 
is direct and constant attention from the center. Policy implementation outcomes therefore 
often directly or indirectly relate to the differences between priorities at the national level and 
local incentives.  
                                                 
7 Nan Zhou, Mark Levine, and Lynn Price, “Overview of Current Energy Efficiency Policies in China,” Energy 
Policy, Vol. 38, No. 11, (2010), pp. 6439 - 6452; Michal Meidan, Philip Andrews-Speed, Philip and Ma Xin 
“Shaping  China's  Energy  Policy:  Actors  and  Processes,”  Journal  of  Contemporary  China,  Vol.  18,  No. 61 
(2009), pp. 591 - 616. 
8  Kenneth  Lieberthal  and  Michel  Oksenberg,  Policy-Making  in  China:  Leaders,  Structures,  and  Processes, 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988); David Lampton, “The Implementation Problem in Post-Mao 
China,” in Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China, David Lampton ed., (Berkeley CA: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1987);  Kenneth Lieberthal, “China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental Policy Im-
plementation,” in China Environment Series (Stanford: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2003). 
9 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004); Kevin O’Brien and Liangjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural 
China,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, (1999), pp. 167 - 186. 
10 Ran Ran, Environmental Politics at Local Levels in China: Explaining Policy Implementation Gap and As-
sessing the Implications, (PhD Dissertation, University of Duisburg-Essen, 2009). 
11 Benjamin van Rooij, “Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular Enforcement and Political 
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  These four approaches focus on the way governance practices and decision-making struc-
tures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little research has shown what strategies local 
leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests.
12 The low ambiguity 
of energy intensity reduction targets, and the high conflict involved in their implementation, 
makes ESER policy implementation a site of political contestation.
13 This research therefore 
highlights political mechanisms and incentives that local officials use to build support for pol-
icies that  are sometimes unpopular.  Formal incentives for  government officials  and state-
owned enterprise (SOE) managers are political in nature and include evaluation criteria such 
as economic growth, social stability, and employment figures
14, along with softer evaluation 
factors such as environmental pollution and emissions reductions. For both SOEs and private 
enterprises, formal incentives provided in environmental policy implementation schemes are 
profit-based  and  include  subsidies  and  expedited  approval  of  production  scale  expansions 
after the removal of old equipment. Informal incentives for government officials include a 
preference for harmony in their locales and consensus building, strong personal relationships 
with enterprise managers,
15 and an interest in sustaining grey income flows.
16 For enterprises, 
informal incentives include officials’ provision of preferential access to land and funds, strong 
personal  relationships  with  local  officials,  and  informal  assurances  of  continued,  uninter-
rupted business operation. 
 
  To illustrate how leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation 
mechanisms officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incen-
tives to fulfill energy efficiency objectives. The first is interest-bundling, which occurs when 
government officials link their own political interests with the economic and political interests 
of the large enterprises essential to successful implementation of the ESER policy. Officials 
link their interests with those of state-owned and private enterprise managers by signaling and 
communicating the importance of the ESER policy and indicating the willingness of the local 
government to provide incentives to comply. This approach avoids adversarial relationships 
with important local enterprises. The second mechanism is policy-bundling. Some ESER pol-
icies are connected with policies and concerns of more local or immediate interest like local 
pollution control or work supervision and safety. At other times, their implementation may be 
implicitly tied to formally unrelated policies with greater public emphasis and larger official 
                                                 
12 Adrian Leftwich, "Beyond Institutions: Rethinking the Role of Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Institu-
tional Formation of Developmental States and Strategies," Forum for Development Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 
(2010), pp. 93 - 111. 
13 For an in-depth description of the ambiguity-conflict model of implementation, see Richard Matland, “Synthe-
sizing the Implementation Literature: the Ambiguity Conflict Model of Policy Implementation,” Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1995), p. 145 - 174. 
14 Pierre Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: the Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the 
Post-Mao Era, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Susan Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural 
China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
15 Peter Hills and C.S. Man, “Environmental Regulation and the Industrial Sector in China: the Role of Informal 
Relationships in Policy Implementation,” Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1998), pp. 53 
– 108. 
16 Shaoguang Wang, “Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Mode of Governance in China,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 46 (2006), pp. 1 – 30; Andrew Wedeman, “The Intensification of Corrup-
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support. These approaches increase public support and lessen resistance to implementation. 
The third tool is framing, a concept that originates from sociological research.
17 Frame analy-
sis has been applied to the politics of environmental, energy, and climate change discourse 
and describes the effectiveness of linguistic ‘reframing’ of policies in dominating public per-
ceptions of issues.
18 In this study, research suggests that local leaders ‘frame’ by conceptualiz-
ing and describing policies in ways that play to interests in their localities. This helps to create 
coalitions to support implementation of initiatives which are prima facie detrimental to inter-
est groups or the public in general. Through these methods, municipal and county officials 
with unambiguous incentives to meet energy intensity target reductions can balance national 
and provincial demands with local interests. At the same time, they bundle ESER policy in 
ways that make it relevant to concerns of greater local importance. Ultimately, local officials 
take policies and programs of national and international concern and then bundle and frame 
them in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.  
 
  In the following two sections, this paper introduces the national and provincial level en-
ergy efficiency efforts, highlighting the formal policy structures. This description also points 
out  the  shortfalls  of  formal  incentives  that  necessitate  policy  implementation  mechanisms 
outside of these structures. The paper then continues with a detailed analysis of the corre-




3  National Context 
 
  Between 2002 and 2005, China’s energy intensity increased at an average of 3.8 percent
19 
reversing a long-term trend of continuous energy efficiency improvements. In response to this 
development, the central government in 2004 began to introduce a series of policies, adminis-
trative plans, and laws to fill this gap and strengthen energy conservation work. Most impor-
tantly, in 2006, the Chinese central government introduced administrative measures to control 
energy growth and reduce energy intensity. The measures include an ESER program, which 
relies on administrative measures and tools deployed in China’s fragmented vertical and hori-
zontal (tiao tiao kuai kuai ￿￿￿￿) governance structure, the most important of which are 
mandatory, ‘hard’ (ying xing￿￿) energy intensity reduction targets for government depart-
ments and enterprises. Other administrative measures and tools introduced between 2006 and 
2008 are less stringent, but also important. In concert with the introduction of the hard targets, 
the central government also published a list of ten key energy-savings projects, ten key ‘peo-
ple’s  projects’,  energy  efficiency  guidelines  and  industry  efficiency  standards,  along  with 
                                                 
17 See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). 
18 Maarten Hajer. The Politics of Environmental Discourse. Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process. 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995). J. Ivan Scrase and David Ockwell, “The Role of Discourse and Lin-
guistic Framing Effects in Sustaining High Carbon Energy Policy: An Accessible Introduction,” Energy Pol-
icy, Vol. 38, No. 5 (2010), pp. 2225-2233. 
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  As noted in the literature, hard targets in the cadre responsibility system are generally re-
served for economic growth goals and measurements of social stability.
21 Energy policies of 
the 11
th Five-Year Plan and the new developments in cadre management thus reflect the great 
emphasis placed on energy consumption saving at the highest levels of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) and State Council, and can be considered a national reassessment of the 
‘growth at any cost’ model previously pursued throughout the country.  Yet, the ultimate suc-
cess or failure of national initiatives continues to depend on local implementation.  
 
  Signaling from Beijing made it clear that faithful implementation of energy efficiency 
goals are a national priority, but the ESER program, begun in 2006 and in earnest at the pro-
vincial level in 2007, had a difficult start. Early government reports indicated that most prov-
inces and the nation as a whole fell far short of initial yearly targets.
22 By the end of 2008, the 
country seemed on track to meet its energy intensity reduction target of 20 percent, but, in 
winter 2009, this trend reversed and energy intensity in China increased by 3.2 percent
23, 
bringing into question the nation’s ability to meet its targets. In May 2010, Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao called for local officials to ‘use an iron hand’ when implementing the ESER pol-





  Whether or not the country reaches its energy intensity reduction targets by 2010, the sig-
nificance of the return to more or less effective energy management should not be underesti-
mated. The high-energy intensity consumption practices in the 1990s and early 2000 provided 
opportunities for the development of entrenched business, economic, and political interests at 
the local level. At the same time, with the ‘grab the large, let go the small‘￿zhua da fang xiao 
￿￿￿￿￿reform in the mid-1990s, which saw the privatization of small, locally-administered 
SOEs and the restructuring and modernization of the largest, predominantly centrally-run, 
enterprises, the Chinese local state’s regulation capacity decreased. How then can energy effi-
ciency accomplishments be explained and how were local officials able or willing to over-





                                                 
20 For an overview of recent national energy efficiency policies, see Nan Zhou, Mark Levine, and Lynn Price, 
“Overview of Current Energy Efficiency Policies in China,” pp. 6439 - 6452. 
21 Maria Edin, “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township 
Perspective,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 173 (2003), pp. 35-52. Whiting, S. H., Power and Wealth in Rural 
China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
22 Nan Zhou, Mark Levine, and Lynn Price, “Overview of Current Energy Efficiency Policies in China,” pp. 
6439 - 6452. 
23 “Wen Jiabao: Luoshi Zeren Quebao Shixian 'Shiyiwu' de Jieneng Mubiao” ("Wen Jiabao: Fulfill Responsibili-
ties  to  Ensure  Realization  of  Five-Year  Plan  Energy  Intensity  Targets”)  available  at 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2010-05/06/content_19978943.htm, last accessed on September 18, 2010. 
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4  Local Context: Shanxi Province 
 
  Shanxi province has a high proportion of energy-intensive industry. In 2008, overall in-
dustrial production accounted for 54 percent of GDP and close to 76 percent of net taxes on 
production and heavy industry accounted for 81 percent of provincial energy consumption.
25 
This carries with it implementation and transitional challenges, yet Shanxi has nonetheless 
arguably successfully implemented ESER policy. Shanxi provincial leaders have formulated 
policies stricter than national requirements, and are on track to meet their ESER goals.
  
 
  Provincial  policy  overall  heavily  reflects  policies  at  the  national  level.  The  provincial 
leaders have passed on the 11
th Five-Year Plan’s provincial 2010 goal of a 25 percent reduc-
tion in energy intensity against 2005 levels, to lower level governments and departments. The 
2007 decision by the State Council to turn energy intensity reduction into ‘hard targets’ was 
outlined in provincial policy in 2008.
26 The province government also distributed its nation-
ally assigned goal of completing 4.6 million square meters of energy-saving building renova-
tions to lower level governments and departments, along with energy-efficient light bulb dis-
semination, district heating and other targets.
27 
 
  Yet, provincial policy is not limited to national requirements. Shanxi leaders, including 
the governor and heads of the Shanxi Economic Commission and Development and Reform 
Commission, will be held responsible for progress in energy efficiency by the end of the 11
th 
Five-Year Plan and therefore have strong incentives to ensure completion of national effi-
ciency requirements when formulating Shanxi’s provincial policy. Provincial leaders went 
beyond national requirements and made provincial ESER policy stricter than national policy 
to ensure their completion as leaders anticipated some local ESER efforts to fail or to be dis-
counted by national inspection teams. Provincial targets assigned by the national government 
were raised for municipalities, counties, and enterprises to ensure completion of the overall 
provincial 11
th Five-Year Plan target. In one municipality, for example, targets at the county 
level generally ranged from 27 percent to 30 percent in energy intensity reduction.
28 In sup-
plement to national policies, Shanxi province introduced a Top-200 enterprise program mod-
eled after the national Top-1000 Enterprise Program,
29 which was later expanded to a provin-
cial 1000 enterprise program after improved energy use calculations. These national and pro-
vincial top-enterprise programs were intended to improve energy efficiency at the province’s 
and nation’s largest energy consuming enterprises. The provincial government also approved 
                                                 
25 Shanxi Province Bureau of Statistics, Shanxi Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
26 Shanxi People's Government, Shanxi People's Government Document [2008] No. 16, (June 2008) 
27 Shanxi People's Government, Shanxi People's Government Document [2007] No. 32, (September 2007) 
28 Interview 21, July 2010, Municipal Economic Commission Official  
29 For an overview of the national program, see Lynn Price, Xuejun Wang, Jiang Yun, ‘The Challenge of Reduc-
ing Energy-Consumption of the Top-1000 Largest Industrial Enterprises in China,’ Energy Policy, Vol. 38, 
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provincial energy efficiency standards more stringent than national standards in some indus-
tries such as steel and magnesium.
30 
 
  These ambitious provincial targets and policies created a provincial energy efficiency pol-
icy structure strongly in line with national interest, yet created implementation difficulties, 
especially  regarding  funding.  Given  the  expansion  of  energy  efficiency  programs,  Shanxi 
province uses additional provincial funds to support these initiatives. In particular, in 2007 
provincial leaders created a ‘Coal Sustainable Development Fund’ through taxation of all 
provincial coal exports and since then has used part of this money to provide funding for en-
ergy-saving initiatives, in addition to projects to counteract the detrimental impacts of coal 
extraction in the province.
31 The establishment of this fund took advantage of provincial in-
terest and circumstance and bundled them with both coal mining concerns and the ESER im-
plementation incentives.  
 
  This ‘Coal Sustainable Development Fund’ serves a number of purposes. First, it aims to 
soften the social and economic consequences of coal mining in Shanxi.
32 Second, it ensures 
that other provinces benefiting from the use of Shanxi coal foot the bill for costs not reflected 
in the price of coal. Third, it aims to raise the costs of exports and keep Shanxi resources 
within the province to ensure greater GDP creation from industrial processing, instead of low-
wealth creation from exporting natural resources. Fourth, and most importantly, it fills gov-
ernment coffers and greatly enhances provincial policy implementation capacity in a number 
of key areas, including city greening initiatives and ESER policy implementation. Between 
March 2007 and the end of 2009, the fund reportedly collected over 43 billion yuan.
33 
 
  In addition, interest convergence was not limited to financial capacity building, but also 
occurred during the formulation of the relatively stringent industry efficiency standards. As 
mentioned above, Shanxi province enacted provincial energy efficiency standards in indus-
tries such as steel and magnesium stricter than those set out at the national level. These pro-
vincial efficiency standards are created by the enterprises themselves giving them room to 
account for their own interests. For some industries such as magnesium or steel, which are 
dominated by one enterprise in the province,  efficiency standards are created by  a single 
drafter before being approved by enterprise associations and the  government. Although it 
seems counter-intuitive  for enterprises to willingly draft tough standards, especially  when 
they are sufficiently stringent to lead to cost increases, in fact, many large enterprises have 
incentives to create high efficiency standards to squeeze small producers out of the industry 
and increase their market share. One manager of a large magnesium enterprise, for example, 
                                                 
30 Interview 51, July 2010, Provincial Economic Commission Official; Interview 44, July 2010, County Eco-
nomic Commission Official 
31 Shanxi People's Government, Shanxi People's Government Document [2007] No. 39, (September 2007) 
32 For an in-depth study on the socioeconomic consequences of coal mining, see Philip Andrews-Speed, Xin Ma, 
‘Energy Production and Social Marginalization in China,’ Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 17, No. 55 
(2008), pp. 247 – 272. 
33    Zhong  Guo,  “Danghao  ‘Meitan  Xinzheng’  Shouhuzhe”  (“A  Good  Guardian  of  the  ‘Coal  New  Deal,’”) 
Zhongguo  Caizheng  Bao  (China  Financial  Report),  June  5  2010,  available  at 
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cited this as a major reason for supporting strict standards.
34 Indeed, this enterprise pushed for 
standards approved in Shanxi to also be approved at the national level, but met with resistance 
from enterprise owners in other provinces and national government officials concerned that 
they would limit growth in the industry. 
 
  However, despite these funding and standard-setting factors some provincial policies con-
tinued to run against local demands and interests. Many energy efficiency methods promoted 
by the national and provincial governments provided few enterprise cost-savings, except in 
the very long-term. According to one interviewee, a common saying among local enterprise 
managers is that ‘energy-savings are not cost-saving’ (jieneng bu jieqian ￿￿￿￿￿). This is 
especially the case as subsidies continue to be insufficient. For example, subsidies and re-
wards distributed by the provincial Development and Reform Commission and sometimes by 
the municipal and county governments are considered ‘symbolic’ and not always given out in 
a consistent manner. When subsidies are given, they are given after the project completion, 
creating a high level of uncertainty for enterprises considering energy-saving projects. Ac-
cording to one municipal official, between 2007 and 2009, there were around 250 industrial 
projects to upgrade production efficiency in the municipality. Of these, only 44 of the largest 
projects received subsidies.
35 Indeed, throughout Shanxi, only enterprises with very large pro-
duction capacity and relatively advanced production capability, which are often large enter-
prises of significant economic and political importance, consistently receive compensation, 
subsidies and rewards. 
 
  Due to insufficient financial resources and policy aspects that ran in opposition to local 
interest, the necessity for local officials to bundle provincial and national interest with local 
interest remained. Among different ESER programs and measures the most important and 
locally  emphasized were the  provincial  Top-1000 Enterprise Program,  the ‘elimination of 
backwards production capacity' and small plant closure policy, industry  energy  efficiency 
standards, and social 'ten key projects' program such as efficient light bulb programs, district 
heating and waste water management and energy-saving renovations in residential housing. 
This paper will examine two of them – the Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the 
‘elimination of backwards production capacity’ and small plant closure policy – and analyze 
the extent to which bundling of interests and policies, along with framing for the interests and 




5  Interest-Bundling, Policy-Bundling, and Framing 
5.1  Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program 
  The Top-1000 Enterprise Program in Shanxi is perhaps the most important component of 
the ESER policy at the local level. Enterprises on the list account for 90 percent of energy use 
                                                 
34 Interview 45, July 2010, Manager of Large Industrial Enterprise 
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in the province according to calculations by the Shanxi Provincial Economic Commission,
36 
and energy efficiency improvements at these enterprises are the primary factor determining 
officials' progress towards energy intensity reduction hard targets. To implement the 1000 
enterprise program, local leaders sign responsibility contracts committing themselves to en-
ergy intensity reductions in their jurisdictions, and then sign responsibility contracts with the 
enterprise managers on the 1000 enterprise list, committing them to specific energy consump-
tion targets.  
 
  Because the targets in the cadre responsibility system are tied to these agreements, local 
leaders and officials have strong incentives to implement the Top-1000 Enterprise policy. At 
the same time, however, they have both limited willingness and capacity to enforce targets 
and standards. Local leaders such as the mayors and party secretaries have greater influence 
and implementation capacity than Economic Commission officials, but are not always willing 
to give priority to the enforcement of ESER policy. Mayors and party secretaries have many, 
sometimes conflicting, priorities and targets, and energy intensity targets are just one of them. 
As a result, Economic Commission officials often carry out ESER policies without the leader-
ship’s unconditional support for strict enforcement measures and must consider economic and 
political interests of enterprises to ensure their cooperation.  
 
  In terms of supervision and enforcement capacity at the county level, usually only one or 
two people in the Economic Commission are in charge of energy efficiency at enterprises. 
The same officials are responsible for many different industrial production and technology 
standards.  With limited industry knowledge, it is difficult for them to thoroughly evaluate the 
required energy reports delivered by the enterprises. Even with greater human resources and 
skills, local Economic Commission officials cannot effectively implement ESER policy with-
out the support and cooperation of large energy-intensive enterprises. The local governments 
can punish enterprises who exceed industry efficiency standards by raising the enterprise’s 
electricity price and ordering utility companies to cut off electricity and water to the enter-
prise,  a  policy  commonly  referred  to  as  ‘cut  water  cut  electricity’  (duanshui  duandian 
￿￿￿￿), but the legal basis for these punishments is tenuous, and enterprises can resist or 
appeal their enforcement.   
 
  Given their limited willingness and ability to enforce the policy, local leaders and officials 
often choose to bundle their own political interests with the economic and political interests of 
enterprise managers. Government officials ensure and explain to managers the formal rules 
and incentives within the national and provincial ESER policy such as provincial, and in some 
cases municipal, subsidies and often also provide informal incentives outside the formal im-
plementation structure. Although the existence of subsidies and formal incentives such as 
                                                 
36 Shanxi Economic and Information Commission, Shanxi Economic and Information Commission Document 
[2010] No. 2, (May 2010). This statistic was calculated using a broad definition of the word ‘industrial’, en-
compassing all aspects of energy use that might be impacted by industrial policy implementation, and was 
used to emphasize the importance of the Economic Commission’s work. The provincial Development and Re-
form Commission and the provincial Construction Bureau went by different numbers. An official from the 
Construction Bureau, for example, believed the number should be closer to one third, as it set down by the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission, with transportation and housing taking up the remaining two 
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promotions are clear, subsidy and compensation applications are complex and mistakes will 
result in denial of funding. Also, subsidies are limited and enterprise managers may be doubt-
ful that their applications will succeed. Assurances and assistance from local officials can thus 
be essential to an enterprise manager’s confidence that ESER measures will receive compen-
sation from the government. On the informal side, when local officials and managers have 
close relationships, personal or professional, they persuade enterprises of benefits through 
unofficial means, such as personal appeals and preferential treatment for enterprises that make 
voluntary efforts to reduce energy consumption. Highlighting potential political, economic, or 
social benefits to be gained from implementing ESER measures is one of the informal means 
employed by government officials. Thus, government officials bundle their own political in-
terests such as evaluations and promotion opportunities with the economic and political inter-
ests of enterprise managers, which vary according to enterprise forms of ownership.  
 
  Formal and informal incentives differ for SOEs and private enterprises. For SOEs, man-
agers are more easily incentivized to meet ESER targets as they can be punished through po-
litical performance evaluations if they fall short of their goals. They can be excluded from 
year-end bonuses and be subject to other political punishments.
37 Beyond this, SOE managers 
may also implement the policies for perceived political benefit outside of the formal incentive 
structure. For some large SOE managers, government signaling communicates an advance-
ment opportunity. If they can significantly increase energy efficiency and increase GDP per 
unit of energy consumed, they may be able to expect a number of political benefits and per-
haps a promotion. For example, it is common knowledge among Shanxi enterprise managers 
that the former head of the largest iron and steel plant in Shanxi, Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Tai-
gang ￿￿), was promoted to deputy governor of the province after increasing efficiency and 
raising production standards at the company. 
 
  Offering political incentives, on the other hand, does not work as well for private enter-
prises owners. Private enterprises primarily evaluated ESER policies based on profit maximi-
zation criteria and energy efficiency projects do not always result in significant cost-savings. 
Accordingly, local officials can use signaling and persuasion to assure business managers of 
secure  long-term  operation,  preferential  treatment  for  future  expansion  projects,  increased 
market share resulting from eventual consolidation of production capacity to the most effi-
cient enterprises, and other economic benefits. A key component of the secure long-term op-
eration incentive is continued access to local financing. Local banks, although making deci-
sions independently, commonly align loan decisions with interests of local mayors and party 
secretaries.
38 Loans are thus tied to the loan preferences of local leaders, who are incentivized 
to prioritize large, energy efficient enterprises that met their ESER targets. Therefore, the pri-
vate enterprise ESER interest-bundling is to some extent a race to stay on the government’s 
good side and maintain preferential access to government-provided resources. 
 
   Signaling, informal assurances, and actual political and economic incentives are some-
times not enough to convince enterprise managers to improve energy efficiency. Some cases 
require concrete enforcement to ensure overall locality energy intensity reductions. Officials 
                                                 
37 Shanxi People's Government, Shanxi People's Government Document [2007] No. 32, (September 2007) 
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thus sometimes seek compromises to ensure enterprise managers will be as receptive as pos-
sible to enforcement. One way that local governments can bundle their ESER ‘hard target’ 
interests while also preventing long-term, undue harm to local interests is to use a measure 
called 'sleeping management' (xiumian guanli ￿￿￿￿). For example, in one county, by early 
2010 local leaders realized that they were not able to meet their ESER targets set in the 11
th 
Five-Year Plan because of a single new coal power plant, which had greatly increased the 
overall energy intensity in the county. The income from this new plant is important to the lo-
cal economy and government revenue, yet the detrimental impact on the energy intensity in 
the locality is undeniable. As a compromise, the local government therefore will require this 
enterprise and other energy-intensive enterprises which have greatly exceeded energy con-
sumption standards to close in rotation for several months at the end of 2010. In this way, the 
local leaders hope to satisfy their ESER targets without actually having to close any of the 
concerned enterprises completely and suffer the social and economic consequences that would 
result. In addition, local officials in this locality and others use this example of enforcement to 
pressure other enterprises to comply. For the coal power plant temporary closure is a com-
promise because the company is allowed to continue operation, but for other enterprises, offi-
cials can employ impermanent closures as a very strong punishment. 
 
  That is, local governments rarely resort to harsh punishments, but still use it as a very real 
threat for enterprises if the jurisdiction is close to falling short of the officials' ESER targets 
and the mayor and other high level officials find themselves with their 'backs to wall'. Given 
tight personal networks between government officials and larger enterprise managers, local 
enterprises are aware of the importance of energy reduction to mayors and high level officials, 
even if they have little reason, legally or with respect to political influence, to listen to the 
appeals  of  Economic  Commission  representatives.  Signaling  by  the  government,  often 
through informal channels, such as former government officials in management positions at 
large private enterprises, makes it clear to private enterprises that if they do not comply with 
ESER policies they will certainly be punished. For large enterprises which reduce energy con-
sumption, the signaling from the government officials also ensures them that when they in-
crease costs in the short-term they will not be undercut by other enterprises who avoid energy-
saving renovations. In this way, they can anticipate that if noncompliant enterprises cut cor-
ners to take away market share, they will be punished or even closed.  
 
 
5.2  Policy  of  ‘elimination  of  backwards  production  capacity'  and  small 
plant closure 
 
  The second major and perhaps most reported ESER effort in Shanxi is the push to close 
inefficient and energy-intensive production lines and small industrial enterprises. To imple-
ment it, the Economic Commission in a county or municipality identifies enterprises that vio-
late national and provincial guidelines on industrial equipment and production scale stan-
dards. After receiving the approval of the mayor, local Economic Commissions publish lists 
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time frames for ‘voluntary’ closure. Some closed enterprises or enterprises that shut down 
outdated production equipment receive compensation of around 20 to 30 percent of the closed 
enterprise or production line value, but the majority do not.
39 
 
  When implementing the plant and production line closure policy, local governments are 
more likely to resort to differentiated electricity pricing and cutting off electricity and water, 
especially for small enterprises. In some cases, local mayors can ask the Security Bureau to 
send police officers to assist with forced closures, along with removal and destruction of fac-
tory equipments. One case in which strict forms of enforcement were used prior to the end of 
the 11
th Five Year Plan was in response to a ‘investment restriction’ punishment imposed by 
the national government that restricted the approvals of all new energy-intensive projects for 
three months. To placate the national government, local leaders ordered one electricity com-
pany to cut off electricity to over 70 enterprises
40 in order to have the investment restrictions 
lifted.
  
   
  For most cases at the local level, there are fewer incentives to undertake this kind of strict 
enforcement, and local officials must consider local economic growth, employment, and so-
cial concerns. Major economic drawbacks of the small enterprise closures are that they de-
crease local GDP, tax revenue, and employment numbers. Local officials partially remedy 
these effects by adding capacity at large, relatively efficient enterprises. Within large enter-
prises, approval for new production lines is normally contingent on the closure of outdated 
production capacity, a national policy.
41 In some localities, enterprises were granted exten-
sions while the new production facilities and equipments were under construction. 
 
  In areas with homogenous local income and no large enterprises, incentivization was more 
difficult and local leaders were willing to make allowances for the economic and social stabil-
ity of the locality. Many local officials anticipated strong opposition to plant closure. In one 
reportedly isolated incident, for example, a local factory owner organized an employee protest 
in response to the coming closure of his enterprise. This situation resulted in the government 
‘persuading’ the owner and his employees that the closure was in the interest of the locality 
and they would be provided re-employment opportunities.
 42 
 
  To avoid possible government-enterprise conflict, the local governments take preemptive 
measures to decrease costs of implementation for local interests. For one small town with a 
single large industrial plant, the county and municipal officials allowed a small, inefficient 
plant to stay open because of its importance in the local economy. This was done only after 
making sure the plant owners realized that they were being done a favor and must return the 
favor by making serious efforts to increase energy efficiency if they were to stay open. At the 
same time, local leaders emphasized that this was a temporary solution only, and that the en-
                                                 
39 Numerous interviews including: Interview 28, July 2010, Municipal Economic Commission Official; Inter-
view 13,  July 2010, County Development and Reform Commission Official 
40 China Finance Weekly, “Shanxi Jieneng Jianghao Taotai Luohou Ke Bu Ronghuan” (“Shanxi Energy Conser-
vation  and  Consumption  Reduction  Elimination  of  Backwards  is  Pressing”),  available  at 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20071210/00124267955.shtml, last accessed on September 16, 2010. 
41 National ‘Link Small Unit Closures to Large Unit Construction Approvals’ Policy 
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terprise must close eventually. In another case, a high profile closing, one local mayor brought 
together representatives from a number of the local departments to ensure that employees los-
ing their jobs would be cared for by the government, and then arranged that they were pro-
vided re-employment and other forms of assistance. Some local officials also aligned their 
interests with those of small enterprise owners and gave enterprises the option of being able to 
sell or keep their equipment if they voluntarily close ahead of the final date for closure,
43 as 
opposed to being forced to remove and destroy equipment as set out in national policy. In this 
way, enterprise managers were given an incentive to implement the policy themselves, mak-
ing highly visible government intervention unnecessary. 
 
  To avoid conflict in another way, local Economic Commission officials and local gov-
ernments took advantage of the aftermath of the Financial Crisis in 2009 to make progress on 
plant  closure  policy  implementation.  The  economic  slow-down  resulted  in  many  energy-
intensive enterprises operating in the red and thus not vehemently opposed to exiting the in-
dustry, or, when applicable, readily willing to accept the small compensation offered for clo-
sure. Many 'closed' enterprises were already near bankruptcy by the time the ESER 'elimina-
tion of backwards production capacity' and small plant closure policy implementation was 
undertaken in earnest in 2008 and 2009.
44 At the same time, it could be inferred that the social 
unrest issues could be avoided by attributing the closure to the economic circumstances, in-
stead of government interventionist behavior. 
 
  In addition to interest alignment, local officials avoided conflict in the policy implementa-
tion of ‘elimination of backwards production capacity’ and small plant closure when they 
bundled implementation with another policy.  Plant  closure  was  implemented  together 
with the environmental clean-up prior to the 2008 Olympics, with campaigns to improve work 
supervision and tax collection, and with pollution reduction policy. 
 
  First, ESER plant closures were at times carried out in conjunction with the 2008 Olym-
pics clean up policy, although the link between the two policies did not become apparent to 
small enterprise owners until after the event. Local officials asked enterprises to close in the 
name of the Olympics, but were aware that national and provincial policy would allow them 
to  prevent  these  enterprises  from  re-opening.  Many  small  plants  which  had  thought  they 
would only stop production during the lead up to the Olympics and would be allowed to pick 
back up where they left off were kept from doing so by the new policies restricting energy-
intensive production.




  Beyond the Olympics policy-bundling, small enterprise closures were also carried out as 
part of a greater campaign against 'low quality' small enterprise managers. The primary goals 
of this campaign were to improve work supervision and tax collection, yet it was loosely tied 
to mine closures, a policy with greater backing from high-level governments. In these cases, 
                                                 
43 Interview 9, June 2010, County Economic Commission Official 
44 Interview 18, July 2010, Provincial Economic Commission Official 
45 Interview 45, July 2010, Manager of Private Industrial Enterprise 
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lack of clarity works to the local officials' advantage, even though the plant closures are pri-
marily ESER policy. Local officials improved regulatory capacity in local safety and tax col-
lection, key areas for local governments, while avoiding confrontation which could count 
against them if any social stability concerns arose. 
 
  In addition to these methods, the prioritization of small plant closures took into account 
the relative pollution emitted by different industries, as all local officials were evaluated on 
SO2 emission reduction goals in addition to energy intensity reductions, and some localities 
faced pressure from provincial, and in some cases, national authorities to improve air quality. 
Specifically, local officials prioritized closing cement, along with iron and steel, small plants 
as they benefited local officials’ emissions reduction goals significantly more than other in-
dustries. Two county official interviewees stated that as long there were enough cement, iron 
and steel, enterprises in the county that officials could close, the locality would easily meet its 
SO2 emissions reduction goals.
47 
 
  Bundling of interests and policies in the closures of small coal mines was stronger than in 
other industries. Small coal mines have much higher rates of fatalities than large, state-owned 
coal enterprises
48; there was increasing national media coverage of coal mine accidents in 
recent years; and, perhaps most importantly, beginning in 2006 the central and Shanxi provin-
cial government planned forced buyouts of small coal mines by large, often state-owned, en-
terprises as part of promoting enterprises ‘getting bigger and stronger’ (zuo da zuo qiang 
￿￿￿￿￿.
 The combinations of these factors, and in spite of the often close relations between 
local officials and small mine owners, brought about a shift in local officials’ willingness to 
close small mining operations. Local officials and coal bosses saw the policy’s implementa-
tion as inevitable as the national and international media coverage of mining disasters in con-
cert with great attention from the CCP’s leadership and the State Council highlighted the so-
cial and political prioritization of the policy. It was seen as only a matter of the time, rather 
than a question of whether it would be enforced.  
 
  State-owned mining companies greatly benefit from the coal mine closure policy. Na-
tional policy requires the consolidation of coal mines to the largest producers
49 and renation-
alization of coal resources in some regions is a top national priority. Coal SOEs are thus able 
to buy out a very profitable industry, one much more profitable than industrial production, at 
little cost and are able to regain control of energy resources, giving them and the government 
leverage over energy use activities from their source. In return, they provide large bases of 
coal production upon which to start the mine production capacity consolidation, resulting in 
precedents for other regions to follow. Mergers and buyouts were begun first in regions with 
significant state-owned mining interests and then gradually carried out in areas with a greater 
concentration of large private enterprises. 
                                                 
47 Interview 8, June 2010, County Environmental Protection Bureau Official; Interview 9, June 2010, County 
Economic Commission Official 
48 Shaoguang Wang, “Regulating Death at Coalmines: Changing Mode of Governance in China,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 46 (2006), pp. 1 – 30. 
49 National Development and Reform Commission, 11
th Five-Year Plan of Coal Industry Development, (January 
2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-01/22/content_503391.htm, last accessed on September 18, 
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  This policy met with harsh resistance from mine bosses (meilaoban ￿￿￿) and other min-
ing interests, as the government offered very low compensation for buyouts and mergers and 
the owners were left with only a fraction of the value of their enterprises.
 50 Yet, it was still 
strictly enforced. After initially resisting the mergers and buyouts, private coal mines began to 
formulate strategies to play to the interests of local governments and, in doing so, ‘buy time’ 
before being forced out of the industry. These strategies focused on improving the enterprises 
image of social responsibility and general benefit to society. Coal enterprises built parks and 
funded rural education and employment programs to position themselves with the government 
as ‘good’ enterprises, and thus deserving to be among the last to undergo merger or buyout.
51 
In the end, however, these enterprises know that they cannot exert enough political influence 
to counteract the confluence of interests aligned against them. 
 
 
5.3  Policy ‘framing’ 
 
  In both the Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the policy of ‘elimination of back-
wards production capacity' and small plant closure officials often 'frame' their ideas in order 
to play to local interests. The Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the ‘elimination of obsolete 
production capacity’ and small plant closure policy are conceptualized by local officials as 
upgrading and production capacity restructuring programs. This framing is also used to em-
phasize that the ESER policies will provide social benefits in the long-run, such as more local 
employment opportunities and improved workplace safety.  
 
  Within this framework, the general view of local officials is that the responsibility of the 
Economic Commission, and the Development and Reform Commission is to shift production 
capacity from small or under-performing enterprises to large, efficient enterprises which can 
produce the greatest GDP with the lowest relative energy consumption. This conceptionaliza-
tion is officially based on the national policy of tying an enterprise's large project approval to 
its small production line closures. Yet at the local level, the policy is unofficially expanded 
from a shift of production capacity within a single enterprise to an inter-enterprise shift of 
production capacity from small enterprises, which are closed, to large enterprises, which cor-
respondingly expand production. Often, beneficiaries of this are state-owned or politically 
influential large private enterprises with access to provincial ‘elimination of obsolete capac-
ity’ compensation and technology upgrade subsidies, given only to very large energy-saving 
projects, especially those which document savings over 10,000 tons of standard coal equiva-
lent.
52 Under ideal settings, local officials conceive that this shift could result in new local 
production greater than the eliminated capacity, higher local value-added due to greater local 
                                                 
50 Hua Geng, “Shijian Zai Wu Meilaoban?” (“Are Coal Bosses Going to Disappear from the Earth?”) Nanfang 
Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), September 16, 2009, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/34791, last ac-
cessed on September 7, 2010. 
51 Interview 37, July 2010, Manager of Private Coal Mine 
52 Lynn Price, Xuejun Wang, Jiang Yun, ‘The Challenge of Reducing Energy-Consumption of the Top-1000 
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processing instead of exports to other provinces or municipalities for processing, and better 
government-enterprise relations resulting from greater tax collection. They also aim to cause 
little damage to the local economy and employment. The latter is possible even in the short-
term as employees of closed enterprises are generally rural migrant workers and not counted 
in employment statistics.  
 
  In addition, officials portray small plant closures as contributing to improved supervision 
and inspection capacity, and increasing the overall level of social responsibility of enterprises. 
This is due to the fact that many safety and employment scandals, along with their cover-up, 
have occurred in small enterprises. There is little supervision of small industrial plants and 
their managers are given a great deal of leeway to conduct business as they wish. By closing 
these small enterprises, they increase the average social responsibility level of enterprises. 
  This framing is perhaps crucial to providing justification for the policies which benefit 
influential enterprises and individuals, especially when it seems insufficient to a local official 
to simply explain that large enterprises are always more efficient. They are presented as being 
in line with provincial policies to consolidate production capacity and increase production at 
the most advanced enterprises to develop ‘local champions’, and to avoid providing assistance 
to small enterprises that are hard to regulate. Several local government interviewees empha-
sized that although many small enterprises were or will be forced to stop production, most 
large enterprises had created increased production capacity by the end of 2008.
53 For example, 
according to one county level official in charge of closures of small enterprises, the local gov-
ernment closed 30 small energy-intensive plants, but these closed plants each had only around 
one million to two million yuan total investment and around 20 to 30 employees. Although 
this would mean that 600-900 employees lost their jobs, the official stressed that the closure 
had little effect on the overall local economy.
 54 In another locality, one county official stated 
that 15 out of 37 coke plants had closed, yet large coke enterprises added more production 
capacity than was eliminated through plant closure policies.
55 This official emphasized that 
although many plants had been closed, overall production capacity had increased, future prof-
its would be greater and tax revenues would correspondingly increase, and that the locality 
had improved the overall 'quality' of its enterprise owners by pushing small enterprise manag-




6  Conclusion 
 
  At the national level, China’s energy savings and emissions reduction policies at the na-
tional level are ambitious and at the provincial level in Shanxi they are even more bold. These 
efforts reflect China’s national reassessment of the ‘growth at any cost’ and the turn towards a 
more  sustainable,  environmentally-friendly,  and  energy-secure  growth  path.  However,  the 
                                                 
53 Numerous interviews including: Interview 31, July 2010, County Economic Commission Official; Interview 
36, July 2010, County Economic Commission Official; Interview 44, July 2010, County Economic Official 
54 Interview 36, July 2010, County Economic Commission Official 
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ultimate success or failure of ESER policies continues to depend on local implementation. 
Given  entrenched  interests  and  the  many  and  sometimes  seemingly  conflicting  demands 
placed upon officials, implementation of ESER policies is difficult and requires officials to 
find compromises with large enterprise players and consolidate local support by forming ad-
hoc coalitions. 
 
  Not all sub-national governments have been successful in completing ESER mandates. In 
the months leading up to the end of the 11
th Five Year Plan, the central government increased 
pressure on these local governments considerably to ensure completion of the national 20 per-
cent energy intensity reduction target. As a last minute response, some sub-national govern-
ments undertook drastic measures to meet their energy intensity goals at the expense of the 
public. For example, in one county in Hebei province, the local government cut off electricity 
to hospitals, homes and rural villages, even to the point that one hospital was forced to close 
once every four days.
56 Such methods in Hebei and other regions forced an emergency note 
from the NDRC in September 2010 which banned short-term electricity cutting and produc-
tion limitation methods that affect residential areas and public services.
57  
 
  This research suggests that some regions such as Shanxi avoided this harsh, eleventh hour 
approach by preemptively bundling national policies with different local business and politi-
cal interests. Local officials built implementation capacity by strengthening formal and creat-
ing informal incentives to improve implementation of some policies such as the Top-1000 
Enterprise Program, and the ‘elimination of backwards production capacity’ and plant closure 
policy. This incentivization depended upon both the communication, explanation, and assur-
ance of formal incentives and the use of informal means such as personal appeals, persuasion, 
and informal promises. In so doing, government officials brought the interests of local enter-
prises in line with the national interest in reducing energy use. To overcome the challenges of 
closing small industrial enterprises and inefficient production lines to meet energy efficiency 
targets, local implementers took into consideration the economic and employment interests of 
their localities to ‘soften the landing’ of enforcement, they bundled energy efficiency policy 
with policies of greater local importance to ensure smooth and ‘harmonious’ realization of 
energy goals, and took advantage of ‘windows of opportunities’ such as the Olympics and the 
economic downturn to decrease the risk of protests and other forms of opposition to govern-
ment intervention. Officials’ ‘reframing’ of the national energy policy goals and its imple-
mentation provided the rationale for steps taken seemingly against the local interest. This 
‘framing’  transformed  national  energy-saving  policy  from  a  conservation-oriented  and  re-
strained development framework to a growth model centered on the expansion of production, 
improved enterprise competitiveness, stable employment, and growing regulatory demands at 
the local level. 
 
                                                 
56  Xing  Li,  “Power  Cuts  Call  for  Energy  Efficiency,”  China  Daily,  September  10,  2010,  available  at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-09/10/content_11286604.htm,  last  accessed  on  September  23, 
2010. 
57 “13 Dishi Jieneng Jianpai Xingshi Yanjun Fagaiwei Jinji Tongzhi Zai Gao Jingzhong” (“The Energy Savings 
and Emissions Reduction Situation in 13 Prefecture-Level Municipalities is Grim--the NDRC Emergency No-
tification Again Sounds the Alarm Bell”), Shanghai Zhangquan Bao (Shanghai Securities Report), available at 
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